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REDEEMING THE LOST GENERATION: THE SCOPE OF THE FIRST
STEP ACT AND COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IN REVISITING PREBOOKER SENTENCING
Kevin Milton*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, a single mother of five living in Memphis, Tennessee, got
involved with a Memphis-based drug ring, assuming several roles in a
trafficking conspiracy.1 At trial, Alice Marie Johnson was convicted of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to
commit money laundering, and attempted possession with intent to
distribute.2 Having been charged in 1993, Johnson was subject to the
mandatory sentencing guidelines established by the United States
Sentencing Commission in 1987. Under this mandatory sentencing
regime, Johnson faced the maximum sentence of life in prison without
the opportunity for parole.3 She served what was presumed to be her
final sentence for more than twenty years.4
In 2020, President Donald Trump pardoned Johnson after she
spoke at the Republican National Convention.5 Johnson, whose
“transformation [had been] described as extraordinary,” received the
“ultimate” act of clemency.6 The decision by the president to bestow a
full pardon seemed fully justified. After her conviction in 1993, Johnson
had turned her life around. She engaged in educational and vocational
programs offered by the prison system.7 She became a certified hospice

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2019, Lafayette College.
1 Peter Baker, Alice Marie Johnson Is Granted Clemency by Trump After Push by Kim
Kardashian West, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/
us/politics/trump-alice-johnson-sentence-commuted-kim-kardashian-west.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Quint Forgey, Trump Pardons Alice Johnson After Her RNC Speech, POLITICO (Aug.
28, 2020, 2:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/28/trump-pardons-alice-johnson-404470.
6 Id.
7 Baker, supra note 1.
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worker and an ordained minister.8 She even helped coordinate the
prison Special Olympics.9 In light of all this, it is hardly surprising that
Johnson received one of the highest, albeit one of the rarest, forms of
clemency.10
While Johnson walked free under the auspices of a presidential
pardon, her co-conspirator, Curtis McDonald, sought relief in the courts
in another way—in the form of compassionate release.11 McDonald,
much like his co-conspirator, was also considered an “exemplary
prisoner.”12 Supporters spoke of him magniloquently, noting that he
had “change[d] the lives of others . . . in prison with him” as well as his
own.13 Family, friends, and the press cried out for clemency.14 Despite
the strong pathos on his side, McDonald, unlike his co-conspirator, was
denied his second chance.15
While such a decision might seem regrettable, only a few years ago
McDonald would have had little ability to seek relief. But in 2018,
Congress passed the First Step Act (FSA),16 one of the most significant
criminal justice reform bills in recent memory.17 Among its more
extensive provisions, the FSA called for the implementation of a risk and
needs assessment system and the retroactive application of the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010.18 The FSA also altered long-standing
compassionate release provisions.19 Under the FSA, inmates could now
petition courts directly for compassionate release rather than through

8 Leora Arnowitz, Alice Marie Johnson Pens Book with Kim Kardashian Intro: 6
Things We Learn in ‘After Life,’ USA TODAY (May 21, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/life/books/2019/05/21/alice-marie-johnson-book-afterlife-kim-kardashian-trump/3695343002/.
9 Baker, supra note 1.
10 See Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 807 (2015).
11 United States v. McDonald, No. 94-cr-20256-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106051, at
*1–2 (W.D. Tenn. June 8, 2020).
12 Tonyaa Weathersbee, Alice Marie Johnson is Free. It’s Past Time for Curtis
McDonald to Join Her., COM. APPEAL (June 20, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://
www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/local/2020/06/20/advocates-rally-freealice-marie-johnson-co-defendant-curtis-mcdonald-risk-covid-19-juneteenthmarch/3210730001/.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 McDonald, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106051, at *28.
16 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
17 Mirko Bagaric et al., Erasing the Bias Against Using Artificial Intelligence to Predict
Future Criminality: Algorithms are Color Blind and Never Tire, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 1037, 1040
(2020).
18 First Step Act § 101(a), § 404(b).
19 First Step Act § 603(b).
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the intermediary of the Bureau of Prisons,20 and courts could now grant
such release should the inmate demonstrate extraordinary and
compelling reasons for doing so.21
Although there are thousands of inmates like Alice Johnson who
were sentenced under the now-defunct mandatory guidelines regime,22
a severe minority will receive a personal pardon from the president, as
evidenced by McDonald’s case. Yet, the expansion of compassionate
release under the FSA may seem like a natural means of granting more
pardons, of correcting a time where judges were forced to impose what
some considered “draconian” mandatory sentences,23 or of providing
incentives and clemency to those exempt from the FSA. This power, of
course, is not unfettered. Any judge seeking to relieve inmates of their
mandatory sentences must grapple with the question of what reasons
establish extraordinary and compelling grounds for their complete
release.24
This is the question before the courts today, and the answers from
the district courts are far from uniform. And while every judge may
hope to have a petition from an inmate as exemplary as Alice Johnson,
each inmate will present nuanced factual contexts in which to consider
the phrase “extraordinary and compelling.” Factors such as old age,
illness, or family obligations may lend themselves naturally to the
inquiry (indeed, they were separate reasons for release in
themselves),25 and good behavior might be a natural place to start as
well. Beyond that, however, little guidance has been given to the courts
in defining what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons for
release.
But what of the change in the guidelines regime itself? Could this
alone be a factor in the compassionate release inquiry that carries
weight? From the establishment of the United States Sentencing
Commission in 1987 to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker in 2005 rendering them advisory, thousands of inmates were
sentenced based on what are now considered unconstitutional
guidelines, which failed to allow for judicial discretion.26 What weight,
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
22 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 59 (2004).
23 Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From
Trial Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 127 (2018).
24 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
25 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 app. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
26 Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral Review,
4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 179, 215 (2014).
20
21
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if any, should this change in the sentencing regime brought about by
Booker carry when considering an inmate’s petition for compassionate
release?
This Comment proposes that, despite some optimism,27 the
compassionate release provisions of the FSA are inadequate to remedy
a number of pre-Booker sentences based on a change in guidelines, and
that guidance from the Sentencing Commission is necessary to address
the concerns of judges and their disparate solutions. Part II provides a
brief overview of both the sentencing guidelines and compassionate
release as well as other second look provisions. Part III presents a
sample of several recent district court opinions that address the place of
the change in guidelines in considering compassionate release requests
and outlines some of the major definitions each court has ascribed to
“extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Part IV synthesizes these
decisions and attempts to draw preliminary conclusions on the
importance of the guidelines change and issues in applying it as a factor
in compassionate release proceedings. Part V concludes by describing
certain alternatives to using compassionate release. This part ultimately
argues that the compassionate release statute would be a good second
look provision, useful in correcting the harsh outcomes of the
mandatory sentencing era, provided it is amended to include certain per
se rules and rebuttable presumptions that make it both fair and easy to
administer.
II. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
A. Sentencing Before and After 1987
Before 1987, sentencing was largely the domain of the judge.28 In
the years leading up to the creation of the Sentencing Commission,
federal judges had largely unlimited discretion in imposing a sentence.29
The sheer amount of discretion led some to condemn the sentencing
system and its resulting disparities.30 Over the years, demands for
judicial accountability and uniformity in sentencing gained traction.31
Due in part to the generally perceived need for uniformity in sentencing,
as well as the “tough on crime” politics of the day, in 1984, Congress
27 See Jones v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 3d 740, 743–44 (E.D. Va. 2020) (“With this
newest legislation, Congress has indeed taken the first step to begin correcting the
wrongs done to the lost generation of 1984 to 2005.”).
28 United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2005).
29 Id.
30 Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 352–53
(2003).
31 Id.
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enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.32 One of its provisions,
the Sentencing Reform Act, created the United States Sentencing
Commission (the “Sentencing Commission”), an independent agency of
the judicial branch tasked with creating sentencing guidelines for the
federal courts.33
The Sentencing Commission’s guidelines created a comprehensive
set of rules which directed courts to impose certain minimum and
maximum sentences based on the severity of the crime and the
defendant’s criminal history.34
From 1987 until 2005, these
“guidelines” were, in fact, mandatory.35 Judges were required to
sentence defendants based on a two-axis chart, considering the severity
of the crime and criminal history. A dizzying array of aggravating and
mitigating factors also influenced sentence length.36 Moreover, the
guidelines, betraying their advisory namesake, allowed departures only
for certain specified reasons.37
While reactions to the guidelines varied, a few federal judges at the
time lamented the changes brought about by the new regime. Some
judges complained of their inability to adjust sentencing based on
several issues not accounted for in the guidelines, essentially turning
them into “robots” that could not account for the “human factor”
inherent in sentencing.38 The guidelines, for example, discouraged
departures based on family matters, employment, and good works.39 In
many cases, judges openly indicated their begrudging adherence to the
mandatory guidelines regime overall.40 Beyond the judiciary, several
scholars criticized the harsh outcomes of the Sentencing Reform Act,
concluding overall that the scheme set out by the Sentencing
Commission committed too many to rigidly harsh sentences.41 Critics
32 Id.; see also Thomas A. Durkin, Apocalyptic War Rhetoric: Drugs, Narco-Terrorism,
and a Federal Court Nightmare from Here to Guantanamo, 2 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 257, 264 (2012).
33 Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity:
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 11 (2013).
34 Id.
35 See id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Maritza I. Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law: The Vital Role of Judicial
Discretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 637, 664
(2012).
39 Id.
40 Conrad & Clements, supra note 23.
41 Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective
Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 190–91 (1993).
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also pointed to its social costs as evidenced by the rising prison
population.42 Supporters responded that such a model of sentencing
was enabled by widely held views about the inefficacy of
rehabilitation.43 In light of the overall judicial reaction to the unfairness
of the mandatory guidelines regime, however, it would be unsurprising
to see federal judges leap upon the opportunity to provide retroactive
relief to those sentenced under such an arguably “draconian” system
through the use of compassionate release.44
B. United States v. Booker and Relief From the Newly
Unconstitutional Guidelines
In 2006, the Supreme Court, in its remedial holding in United States
v. Booker, “severed and excised” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), the provision
rendering the guidelines mandatory, and thus drastically reduced the
power of the Sentencing Commission.45 Although the Court still directed
judges to consult the guidelines, Booker rendered them effectively
advisory.46 Thus, Booker bestowed upon judges power comparable to
that which they enjoyed before the guidelines regime came about,47 and
discretion was once again a part of sentencing. That said, Booker did not
completely emasculate the guidelines. Judges were still required to
consult the guidelines and, in making a downward or upward departure
from the range, were prompted to consult the § 3553(a) factors set out
in the statute, which delineate a number of sentencing goals.48
Moreover, Booker did not make its changes retroactive.49
The lack of retroactivity prompts a fundamental question: what,
then, of those inmates sentenced between 1984 and 2006? Few tools
exist to provide this class of inmates with a second look. Perhaps their
only hope would have been the federal parole system. The parole
42 Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE L.J. 1755,
1761 (1992).
43 Id. at 1760.
44 See United States v. Quinn, 467 F. Supp. 3d 824, 827 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (finding that
the defendant was convicted under a “far more draconian federal sentencing regime”
than exists today).
45 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
46 Id. at 264.
47 Alan Vinegrad & Marc Falkoff, ‘Booker’: A Sea Change in Federal Sentencing?, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 21, 2005, at 4 (“As a result [of Booker] . . . district judges have regained much of
the sentencing discretion they enjoyed before the guidelines.”).
48 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46, 259.
49 In re Zambrano, 433 F.3d 886, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has never
expressly held Booker retroactive. Booker itself did not state that its rule was retroactive
to cases on collateral review. Nor has the Court held Booker retroactive to any
subsequent case.”) (citations omitted).
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system, abolished by the same act that brought about the sentencing
guidelines, used to provide a second look that would allow the prison
system to release and monitor eligible inmates subject to certain
conditions.50 The Parole Commission—the organization responsible for
overseeing parole—was empowered to release inmates under the
supervision of a parole officer, with conditions in place to protect public
safety.51 During the course of its life, the Parole Commission would issue
anywhere between 10,000 and 20,000 decisions each year.52 The
Commission also provided inmates the opportunity to appeal its
decision as of right.53 Since its abolition, the number of annual decisions
has plummeted.54 The dearth of recent decisions is largely due to the
fact that the Comprehensive Crime Control Act—the same act which
brought about the Sentencing Commission—limited parole requests to
those sentenced before November 1, 1987.55 Thus, inmates between
2006 and 2018 had few avenues for relief from the now-defunct
guidelines sentenced them under.
C. New Forms of Relief in the First Step Act
With the passage of the FSA in 2018, Congress introduced a
number of provisions with the potential to incentivize and promote
reductions in sentencing based on inmate behavior. Among other
things, the FSA directed the Bureau of Prisons to incentivize inmates to
participate in recidivism reduction programs through the use of “earned
time credits,” which allow a prisoner to reduce his or her sentence
should they choose to participate in certain programs or should they
engage in good behavior.56 Yet, seventy separate crimes are exempt
from the FSA’s incentives.57 Thus, many inmates sentenced between
1987 and 2006 remain ineligible for such rewards. Additionally, the FSA
prompted the review and enhancement of a “risk and needs assessment
system.”58 The resulting assessment tool, however, while meant to

50 See Shon Hopwood, Second Looks & Second Chances, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 101–
02 (2019).
51 See How Parole Works, DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/
uspc/how-parole-works.
52 PETER B. HOFFMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 73–75
(2003), http://www.justice.gov/uspc/history.pdf.
53 How Parole Works, supra note 51.
54 HOFFMAN, supra note 52.
55 Id. at 26.
56 Brandon L. Garrett, Federal Criminal Risk Assessment, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 135,
137 (2019).
57 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D).
58 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a).
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grant early release, was partially limited in scope to those who
presented a “minimum” or “low” risk of recidivism.59
Beyond time credits, the FSA offered another avenue for reductions
in sentencing through the expansion of federal compassionate release
provisions. Prior to the FSA, an inmate could obtain compassionate
release only upon a motion of the Bureau of Prisons, thereafter proving
extraordinary and compelling reasons for granting such a request,
which included medical reasons, age, family circumstances, and the allambiguous “other reasons.”60 In the prior regime, the Bureau of Prisons
rarely granted these requests.61 Under the new regime, inmates can
petition the courts directly for compassionate release after exhausting
all other administrative remedies.62
The policy statement
accompanying the compassionate release provision did not provide
greater detail as to what exactly constitutes “other reasons” for
release.63
Thus, at present, courts possess wide latitude in
interpretation.64
Overall, courts are now charged with orchestrating the
compassionate release inquiry. In this inquiry, courts are first tasked
with determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist
for release and, moreover, whether release comports with the broad
sentencing goals set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).65 Upon finding an inmate
eligible for compassionate release, a court may either eliminate or
modify the sentence as well as impose safeguards, such as supervised
release.66 In short, the compassionate release question, without much
guidance beyond § 3553(a), is in the hands of the courts, allowing
perhaps greater access to the provision than before. Indeed, with the
final decision to grant release based on extraordinary and compelling

18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii).
Hopwood, supra note 50, at 100, 103–04.
61 Id. at 103–04; William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A ReExamination of the Justifications for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850, 866
(2009).
62 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
63 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
64 United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[T]he First Step Act
freed district courts to consider the full slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons
that an imprisoned person might bring before them in motions for compassionate
release.”).
65 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
66 Id.
59
60
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reasons now resting with the courts, the number of successful
compassionate release petitions has nearly quintupled.67
III. THE SCOPE OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE: DISTRICT COURT
INTERPRETATIONS OF “EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING”
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that neither Congress
nor the Sentencing Commission has provided any more guidance on
what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.68
Although some courts have divined a narrow congressional intent
through legislative history,69 many have ultimately found that the term
itself is broad and open for judicial interpretation.70 The only policy
statement suggesting a more concrete definition of “extraordinary and
compelling” is, as many courts have found, defunct.71 The vestigial
statement appears to conflict with the FSA insofar as it still grants the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons exclusive authority to petition courts
for review, whereas the FSA clearly allows inmates to petiton courts
directly.72 The Sentencing Commission has been unable to promulgate
additional guidelines due to the lack of a quorum.73 Thus, judges have
largely been left to themselves to determine the scope of the
“extraordinary and compelling” term, resulting in a number of diverse
and conflicting solutions from district courts struggling to implement it,
as will be discussed below.
In granting compassionate release, courts are not merely tasked
with determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist
to justify release. Additionally, if the inmate is above seventy years old,
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons must determine that the petitioner
is not a danger to society.74 For both classes of inmates, courts must also
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: ONE YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION 47
(2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2020/20200831_First-Step-Report.pdf.
68 See United States v. Willingham, No. CR 113-010, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212401, at
*4 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2019).
69 Id.
70 United States v. Cisneros, No. 99-00107 SOM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101027, at *5
(D. Haw. June 9, 2020) (finding that “courts may exercise broad discretion in
finding extraordinary and compelling circumstances”).
71 United States v. Hood, No. H-99-259, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168451, at *21 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 15, 2020).
72 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018); 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
73 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, OFFICE OF EDUC. & SENT’G PRAC., FIRST STEP ACT 5 (Feb. 2019),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/newsletters/2019-special_
FIRST-STEP-Act.pdf.
74 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).
67
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decide that a departure from the original sentence is warranted by the
§ 3553(a) factors—factors that delineate broad goals identified by
Congress to be achieved by sentencing.75 Such factors take into account
some of the broader theoretical goals of sentencing such as deterrence.76
Thus, extraordinary and compelling reasons for release will not
suffice—those reasons must comport with several of these broad goals
for an inmate to succeed on a compassionate release claim.77 The
question, then, is how courts are interpreting “extraordinary and
compelling” in conjunction with the § 3553(a) factors to either grant or
deny compassionate release, particularly with respect to the idea that a
change in the sentencing regime might be extraordinary in itself.
A. District Courts Incorporating the Change in Sentencing as
Relevant to Compassionate Release
In one line of cases, federal courts have responded positively to
arguments that a change in the sentencing regime may carry weight in
the “extraordinary and compelling” inquiry. In United States v. Parker,
for instance, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
included, through its own “independent assessment” of the
extraordinary and compelling term, an analysis of whether the change
from a mandatory to advisory regime carried weight in the
compassionate release analysis.78 There, the underlying defendant,
Richard Wayne Parker, was sentenced to life in prison and five years of
supervised release for cocaine-related charges.79 The court found that
the change in sentencing, especially in light of the defendant’s coconspirator having successfully reduced his sentence after Booker,
constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for release,
alongside health complications amidst COVID-19.80 Having satisfied the
broad sentencing goals of § 3553(a) as evidenced by, inter alia, his
achievement of educational degrees, his lack of disciplinary issues, the
guarantees of support from family, and the safeguards of his supervised
release, the judge granted the defendant compassionate release.81

Hopwood, supra note 50, at 107.
Id. at 97 n.66.
77 Such reasons include, inter alia, the nature of the offense, characteristics of the
defendant and their criminal history, and the need for the sentence in order to reflect its
seriousness, deter criminal conduct, protect the public from the defendant, and provide
vocational and educational training to the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
78 United States v. Parker, 461 F. Supp. 3d 966, 980–81 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
79 Id. at 972.
80 Id. at 981.
81 Id. at 982–83.
75
76
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While Parker provided scant reasoning for the court’s sua sponte
determination that a change in the guidelines might constitute an
extraordinary and compelling reason for release, other courts have
provided a richer analysis of the issue. In United States v. Quinn, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California similarly found that
a change in sentencing constituted an extraordinary and compelling
reason for release based on its views about the harshness of the prior
sentencing regime.82 In finding that extraordinary and compelling
reasons existed to justify release, the court began its reasoning by noting
that the defendant was “sentenced under a far more draconian
sentencing regime than exists today.”83 The underlying defendant,
designated as a “career offender,” was sentenced to 562 months in
prison, followed by a five-year supervised release for committing two
armed bank robberies in the Bay Area of San Francisco.84 The court
noted that the defendant “likely would have been released 12 [sic] years
ago . . . if sentenced under today’s regime.”85 This was so, the court
reasoned, provided that “[the defendant] still would have received a
sentence at the low end of the guidelines range, as he did in 1992.”86
With respect to the argument that it is not the court’s job to decide
whether certain updates in sentencing are retroactive, the court noted
that while Congress did not make such changes categorically
retroactive, it still may have contemplated case-by-case judicial
exemptions.87 The court imported some of this reasoning into the §
3553(a) inquiry, noting both that supervised release mitigated safety
concerns and that the defendant’s sentence was sufficient under today’s
standards.88
Similarly, the Northern District of California found in favor of a
defendant on comparable grounds in United States v. Jones, noting both
the harshness of the prior regime and that the likelihood of a downward
departure was the guidelines advisory.89 There, the court found
extraordinary and compelling reasons for release for a defendant
sentenced to over 240 months for counts relating to bank robbery.90
The court reasoned that “[the sentencing judge] accepted the
Government’s recommendation of a sentence at the low end of the
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

United States v. Quinn, 467 F. Supp. 3d 824, 827 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
Id.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 827.
Id. at n.3.
Id. at 829.
See Quinn, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 831.
See United States v. Jones, 482 F. Supp. 3d 969, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
Id. at 972–73.
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guideline range applicable to the bank robbery offenses,” which likely
indicated that “a downward departure may well have been
appropriate.”91
It also noted, however, that “Booker did not
automatically provide relief to defendants like Mr. Jones who were
sentenced before the decision issued.”92 Despite this, the court indeed
found that the change in guidelines, and the likely lower sentence,
constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.93
Other courts have found that a change in the sentencing regime
constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for release even
where there was no indication that the sentencing judge erred on the
lower end of the sentencing range.94 For example, in United States v.
Vigneau, the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island found that
the change in the sentencing regime was extraordinary and compelling
even where the defendant was sentenced to 365 months for marijuanarelated crimes despite an available guidelines range of 292 to 365
months coupled with a mandatory minimum of twenty years for a
related conviction.95 The court noted merely that the sentencing
guidelines were now advisory and that the sentencing judge would be
free to sentence below the range under the current regime.96 The court
further reasoned that Congress intended for compassionate release to
act as a safety valve, comparable to the parole system, which aimed to
remedy harsh sentences.97 Given the defendant’s “unusually long
sentence” as evidenced by modern average sentences for marijuanarelated crimes, there were extraordinary and compelling reasons for
release.98
B. District Courts Rejecting the Change in Sentencing as Relevant to
Compassionate Release
In another line of cases, courts express skepticism regarding the
propriety and feasibility of including a change in the sentencing regime
in the extraordinary and compelling inquiry. Some courts conclude that
a change in the sentencing regime cannot hold weight, as it would be
difficult to accord the sentencing judge due deference and to predict
whether or not they would presently find the sentence unfair. For
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 979 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d 31, 39–40 (D.R.I. 2020).
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37–38.
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example, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
denied compassionate release to Curtis McDonald, Alice Marie
Johnson’s co-conspirator, in part because of a lack of trial record
evidence of the trial judge’s likelihood of guidelines departure.99 In
United States v. McDonald, the court refused to incorporate a change in
sentencing in the compassionate release inquiry.100 The court found
that although a change in the sentencing regime may constitute
extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, it could not say with
finality that McDonald’s sentence was the result of the mandatory
sentencing framework.101 This was so, the court reasoned, because
there was no evidence that the sentencing judge viewed the mandatory
life sentence as “unfair and utterly disproportionate to the crimes.”102 It
noted that other courts could do so given the clear trial record
evidencing the sentencing judge’s displeasure with the regime.103
Courts on this side of the argument have also noted separation of
powers concerns. Elaborating on the reasoning in McDonald, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania similarly found
that a change in sentencing does not constitute an extraordinary and
compelling reason for release due to deference and separation of
powers issues.104 In United States v. Andrews, the court found the
underlying defendant guilty of several crimes relating to his armed
robberies and sentenced him to 312 years in prison.105 The defendant,
in his motion for compassionate release, pointed to several grounds for
a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, including
his age, rehabilitation, susceptibility to COVID-19, the length of his
sentence, the change in the sentencing regime, and the amendment to §
924(c).106 The court found that while the defendant’s first three reasons
could constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, it
held that the final three “implicate[d] separation of powers concerns.”107
With respect to the argument that the change in sentencing may be an
extraordinary and compelling reason, the court found that “[i]f Congress
wanted [changes] to be retroactive on a case-by-case basis, it would

99 United States v. McDonald, No. 94-cr-20256-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106051, at
*1, *18 (W.D. Tenn. June 8, 2020).
100 Id. at *17–18.
101 Id.
102 Id. at *18.
103 Id. at *15.
104 United States v. Andrews, 480 F. Supp. 3d 669, 677–78 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
105 Id. at 673.
106 Id. at 677.
107 Id.
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have said so in the text of the statute.”108 It noted, however, that other
courts have reached the contrary conclusion and allowed the change in
sentencing to hold weight so long as other circumstances accompany
it.109 Moreover, the court noted that considering sentence length would
conflict with the “rule of finality” in sentencing.110
United States v. Nasirun presents another issue involved in the
compassionate release inquiry—that is, the lack of statutory guidance
in construing the phrase “extraordinary and compelling.”111 In Nasirun,
the court sentenced the underlying defendant to four life sentences after
being convicted for several cocaine-related charges.112 The defendant
argued that there were extraordinary and compelling reasons for his
release “because if sentenced today, he would receive a substantially
lower sentence than what the mandatory guidelines called for.”113 The
court found that such reasons were not extraordinary and compelling
because they “are [not] encompassed within the ‘extraordinary and
compelling’ circumstances in the policy statement of § 1B1.13.”114 Thus,
given the lack of proactive clarification by Congress, the inmate failed to
demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.115
IV. COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IS AN INCOMPLETE TOOL FOR REMEDYING PREBOOKER SENTENCING
Some courts have heralded the FSA as the dawn of a period of
revision and restitution.116 They envision an era in which courts will
look back on that unenlightened sentencing period between 1984 and
2005 and correct its more egregious results.117 Others point specifically
to the “safety valve” of compassionate release and its function as a de
facto parole system.118 Yet, the FSA fails to address many classes of
Id. at 681.
Id. at 680–81.
110 Andrews, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 679.
111 United States v. Nasirun, No. 8:99-CR-367-T-27TBM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23686,
at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2020).
112 Id. at *1.
113 Id. at *2.
114 Id. at *5.
115 See id.
116 See Jones v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 3d 740, 743–44 (E.D. Va. 2020).
117 Id. (“The undercutting of Booker’s core remedial measure has created a lost
generation . . . where individual citizens pay penance for the constitutional errors of the
sovereign. For twenty years of this nation’s history . . . harsh sentences . . . were imposed
based on unconstitutionally high guideline ranges . . . . With this newest legislation,
Congress has indeed taken the first step to begin correcting the wrongs done to the lost
generation of 1984 to 2005.”).
118 United States v. Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d 31, 36 (D.R.I. 2020).
108
109
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inmates whose sole mechanism for relief from the wrongs of the prior
regime is compassionate release. Absent a particularized and guiding
policy statement from the Sentencing Commission, compassionate
release is not an effective tool to remedy pre-Booker sentencing. It is a
shallow solution in a world that requires extensive and well-thoughtout second look provisions.
There are several reasons why compassionate release, as it exists
now, is a cumbersome tool for remedying pre-Booker sentences. The
difficulties are roughly divisible into two categories: practicality and
fairness. In the way of practical application of the guidelines, courts
encounter three main difficulties: (i) divining whether the original
sentence truly is egregious and thus “extraordinary,” (ii) encroaching on
the power of the sentencing judge and acting as de facto appellate courts
by frustrating finality in sentencing, and (iii) impeding on the role of
Congress in making changes in sentencing retroactive.
A. Practical Problems in Looking at Changes in Sentencing:
Speculation, Deference, and Separation of Powers
First, granting compassionate release in part based on a change in
guidelines presents a problem of both speculation and encroachment
for judges. In terms of speculation, basing compassionate release on a
change in the sentencing regime puts judges in the fraught position of
speculating whether they should substitute their judgment for that of
the trial judge. As a practical matter, this is not easy, though it may be
easier in some cases than in others. For example, in a case where the
pre-Booker sentencing judge gave the mandatory minimum, the court is
not forced to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing judge.119
When a judge sentenced at the bare end of the sentencing range, and
where modern views of sentencing would encourage a lower sentence,
it is likely that the judge of today and the judge of yesterday would agree
that a lower sentence is warranted.120 The limited evidence available
suggests that courts tend to assume that a defendant’s time served, after

119 See United States v. Jones, 482 F. Supp. 3d 969, 972–73 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (granting
compassionate release where defendant was given the “lowest possible range” under
the then-mandatory guidelines); United States v. Quinn, 467 F. Supp. 3d 824, 826 (N.D.
Cal. 2020) (granting compassionate release where defendant was given the lowest
available sentence of 562 months under the then-mandatory guidelines).
120 See Jones, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 973, 979 (finding both that the sentencing judge
accepted a sentence at the low end of the applicable guideline range and a “gross
disparity” between defendant’s sentence and current sentences); Quinn, 467 F. Supp. 3d
at 827–28 (finding both that defendant would likely have received a sentence at the low
end of the applicable guidelines range and that certain terms of imprisonment “dwarf”
modern median sentences for more heinous crimes).
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the change in the guidelines, is sufficient because a lower sentence likely
would have occurred were it available at the time of sentencing.121
In some cases, there are clear and unequivocal statements by the
sentencing judge available for review.122 In several cases, the
underlying sentencing judges clarified their disagreement with the
mandatory sentencing regime and the outcome forced by the sentencing
guidelines.123 When this blatant frustration coincides with a current
judge’s view that changes in public sentiment on the severity of certain
crimes (i.e., marijuana-related offenses) warrant reduction, there is
little conflict. In such cases, judges on review for compassionate release
will have little trouble finding that the sentence is wholly unnecessary.
In more difficult cases, it is not clear whether the guidelines
hindered the judge’s discretion.124 In such cases, it is not so black and
white. Courts have been and will continue to be put in the awkward
position of speculating on whether the sentencing judge was justified,
why they strayed from the mandatory minimum, and whether the
inmate, accounting for modern thought on just and proportional
sentences, would still have been given the same sentence.125 Simply put,
if the judge exercised at least some discretion—that is, did not opt for
the minimum sentence—or was forced to institute the mandatory
maximum, and there is little change in modern views about certain
offenses, it is difficult for a court to say with certainty that the sentencing
judge would still not impose the same sentence or that the sentence is
patently unfair or unnecessary.
Second, issues of encroachment on the traditional role of the
sentencing judge are at play. Indeed, some judges have been willing to
grant compassionate release even in cases where it was not clear
whether the sentencing judge was exercising the absolute maximum of

See Jones, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 978–79; Quinn, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 827–28.
See United States v. Cuesta, No. 1-374-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167112, at *10 (E.D.
Pa. Sep. 11, 2020) (“[T]he sentencing judge expressed an opinion that this sentencing
range was too harsh given the facts and circumstances of Defendant’s involvement.”).
123 See, e.g., United States v. Young, 458 F. Supp. 3d 838, 840 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (“The
court retains a clear recollection of the sentencing and its strong belief at the time that
the mandatory sentences on the § 924(c) convictions were unfair and utterly
disproportionate to the crimes.”); United States v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 453 (S.D.
Iowa 2019) (“[T]he judge who sentenced Defendant concluded the [sentence] was far
greater than was necessary to achieve the ends of justice.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
124 See United States v. McDonald, No. 94-cr-20256-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106051,
at *17–18 (W.D. Tenn. June 8, 2020).
125 Id.
121
122
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their discretion under the mandatory guidelines.126 Thus, some courts
seem justifiably concerned about encroaching on the sentencing judge’s
power and questioning their sagacity.127 This sort of second-guessing
can fly in the face of basic principles underlying the appellate system of
law. The judicial system contemplates that trial judges are, in most
cases, the ultimate arbiters of fact and, thus, in the best position to
determine sentencing given their proximity to the parties and the
evidence.128 Federal courts have stated that maxim verbatim.129 Such
principles are reflected in the appellate review of a sentence, where an
appellate court “will only overturn a sentence that is ‘arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.’”130
Fixing compassionate release upon an inquiry of whether the
sentence is unfair given a change in the sentencing regime can easily
frustrate the power and deference given to sentencing judges. For one,
the question of whether the sentence is patently unfair given a change
in sentencing would allow courts to overturn the sentence simply
because they presently find it unfair or aberrational,131 thus stepping on
the sentencing judge’s toes merely because they disagree with the
outcome. Relatedly, such a loose standard is not nearly as high a bar as
“arbitrary and capricious”; trial courts, then, would be afforded
immense power that even appellate courts on review do not have.
These problems are evident in cases where judges seem to be willing to
disregard the sentence even where it is unclear whether the sentencing
judge exercised maximum discretion under the pre-Booker
guidelines.132
126 See United States v. Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d 31, 32–33, 40 (D.R.I. 2020) (granting
compassionate release where defendant was originally sentenced to 365 months based
on a guidelines range of 292 to 365 months and a twenty-year mandatory minimum).
127 See United States v. Andrews, 480 F. Supp. 3d 669, 679–80 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“[I]f
the Court were permitted under the guise of compassionate release to reduce a sentence
based on the Court’s idiosyncratic belief that the previously imposed sentence is too
long, compassionate release would . . . swallow[] the general rule of finality.”).
128 See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006).
129 United States v. Alexander, 489 F. App’x 572, 578 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Mindful that the
trial court [is] in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence in light of the
particular circumstances of the case, we find no abuse of discretion.”) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130 United States v. Peña, 963 F.3d 1016, 1024 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States
v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir. 2009)).
131 See Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d at 38 (noting that the Sentencing Guidelines are now
advisory and the defendant likely would not have faced the same sentence today as in
1998).
132 Id. at 32–33 (noting that defendant was sentenced to 365 months based on an
available guidelines range of 292 to 365 months with a twenty-year mandatory
minimum).
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Third, relying on a change in the sentencing regime as the gateway
into the rest of the compassionate release inquiry essentially makes
changes in sentencing retroactive—a decision often reserved to
Congress. The power rests with the legislature, through the Sentencing
Commission, to determine whether certain changes in sentencing are
retroactive.133 The Sentencing Commission’s unique and unusual power
has been upheld by the Supreme Court.134 As some courts have noted,
however, Booker did not make the sentencing change retroactive, and
Congress did not alter that default presumption.135 Allowing the
judiciary to essentially resentence all those sentenced under a
mandatory scheme because of Booker thus implicates separation of
powers concerns.136 If a change in the sentencing regime itself holds
weight, courts risk opening the door to compassionate release to nearly
every inmate sentenced before Booker rendered the guidelines
advisory. Some courts have countered, however, that Congress did
indeed contemplate retroactivity insofar as the mechanism is
fundamentally a quasi-parole system that should allow review of all
viable cases.137
One other, though perhaps less serious concern, is the prospect
that granting release based merely on a change in sentencing does not
account for a risk of recidivism. As previously mentioned, judges must
look to the § 3553(a) factors that set out certain broad sentencing
goals.138 Among these goals is “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”139 Although
some prisoners were granted release in the above cases based partly on
a change in sentencing, this occurred in light of a § 3553(a) analysis
evidencing extremely low risks of recidivism, whether through the
inmate’s personal growth or the reassurances of family.140 Perhaps
most importantly, many of the sentences in the above cases came
complete with a five-year supervised release.141 Thus, judges were
28 U.S.C. § 994(u).
Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991).
135 Guzman v. United States, 404 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2005).
136 United States v. Logan, No. 97-CR-0099(3) (PJS/RLE), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64988,
at *26 (D. Minn. Apr. 1, 2021) (stating that “[t]he Eighth Circuit has held that Apprendi
and Booker are not retroactively applicable. . . . The Court does not believe that [the
defendant] should be able to use a compassionate-release request to make an ‘end-run
around’ the Eighth Circuit’s holdings.”).
137 See United States v. Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d 31, 36 (D.R.I. 2020).
138 Hopwood, supra note 50, at 107.
139 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
140 See United States v. Jones, 482 F. Supp. 3d 969, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2020); United States
v. Quinn, 467 F. Supp. 3d 824, 831 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
141 Id.
133
134

MILTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

10/28/21 4:23 PM

COMMENT

365

given procedural assurances that this full release would be monitored
and were free to speak about the loftier elements of the injustice of the
original sentence while, in effect, only granting parole rather than full
relief. Although a judge may, under the compassionate release
provisions, impose supervised release or merely adjust the sentence,142
sentencing judges may still be discernibly anxious about second
guessing the trial court’s determinations about the defendant’s longterm risk.
B. Lack of Fairness in Relying Strictly on Compassionate Release to
Provide Clemency
Relying on compassionate release, as it exists now, as a major tool
for granting clemency to those sentenced in the harsh pre-Booker world
also runs against notions of fairness. Even if every pre-Booker inmate
were given the opportunity to seek compassionate release based largely
on the simple fact that they are pre-Booker inmates, they often must
prove other extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, such as
exemplary behavior, and must also satisfy the § 3553(a) factors. Yet, if
the judicial consensus is that many thousands of inmates were
sentenced unfairly under a dark and “draconian” mandatory regime,
setting the bar for total clemency as high as “extraordinary and
compelling” is patently unfair.
One reason is that pre-Booker inmates had little reason to aspire to
such exemplary status. If such perfect rehabilitation remains a goal at
all, and that is indeed a question that has long occupied much of the legal
discourse,143 incentives and punishment are the key tools to achieving
it. Scholars and jurists have long recognized the necessity of incentives
to the overall goal of recidivism reduction and rehabilitation.144 The FSA
itself admits as much by providing time credit hours and requiring the
development of a recidivism reduction system with credits in its
framework.145 Unfortunately, pre-FSA, there were few incentives to
engage in good behavior. First, as noted above, the federal parole
system, which would grant partial clemency and monitoring, was
exterminated by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.146 Such
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1014 (1991).
144 See, e.g., People v. Kolzow, 746 N.E.2d 27, 28 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (quoting People v.
Burton, 427 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)) (“[F]elons [sentenced to the
penitentiary] are in greater need of rehabilitation and need a greater incentive . . . to get
them to conform their behavior to what society will accept.”) (second alteration in
original).
145 Garrett, supra note 56, at 135–137.
146 Hoffman, supra note 52, at 1–2.
142
143
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a program was perhaps the largest beacon for inmates, offering tens of
thousands of decisions a year.147 Pre-FSA compassionate release
petitions, moreover, were routinely denied by the Bureau of Prisons.148
Courts have routinely noted that motions for compassionate release
were rarely even filed by the bureau.149 Thus, prisoners sentenced
before 2006 had little hope for relief even in the face of their good work
or personal growth.
If these sentences are truly unjust—or at least now considered
sufficient to accomplish the goals of sentencing under Congress’ modern
view150—then employing such a system is unfair. Prisoners were given
no incentive to demonstrate the sort of extraordinary and compelling
traits that would grant release. Only those who, by their own
circumstances, managed to demonstrate a clean record would be
eligible for this extraordinary remedy. And because it is an
extraordinary remedy, many will not be able to attain it. Compassionate
release thus attempts to sort among angels and demons. There is no
comparable relief for those who may be substantially capable of
rehabilitation and reintroduction to society with more proactive
measures, as the parole system of yore provided.
In short, relying solely on compassionate release is misplaced. It is
marred by practical difficulties, and it can likely only grant relief to those
who saw the light in what some may now see as an unenlightened time.
Even taking into account the injustice of sentences now deemed too
harsh, it cannot provide relief on those grounds unless the petitioner in
question somehow managed to be exemplary, even in a time when there
was little hope for relief. Nor is it a response to say that other provisions
will provide the sort of complete relief that compassionate release
cannot. Even the other provisions of the FSA that use “time credits” to
motivate participation in recidivism reduction programs exempt nearly
seventy crimes.151
V. SECOND LOOK PROVISIONS MOVING FORWARD
As demonstrated above, courts are torn on the question of whether
a change in sentencing will qualify as a gateway to obtaining the rest of
the compassionate release inquiry. Any policy statement or update to
the compassionate release provision moving forward should attempt to
incorporate the concerns of the courts laid out above. In all likelihood,
147
148
149
150
151

Id. at 73–75.
Berry, supra note 61, at 217.
United States v. Marks, 455 F. Supp. 3d 17, 23 (W.D.N.Y. 2020).
See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 467 F. Supp. 3d 824, 828 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D).

MILTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

10/28/21 4:23 PM

COMMENT

367

any remedy to the provision itself will come from such a policy
statement issued by the Sentencing Commission. There are other ways,
however, in which the purposes and problems of compassionate release
might be resolved and served by other means.
First, Congress might create the more comprehensive second look
program that federal courts seem to imagine of compassionate release.
One pending piece of legislation sponsored by Senator Cory Booker
attempts to create such a system.152 While still using the courts, the
Second Look Act would allow courts to grant release and reduce
sentences should an inmate demonstrate their readiness for reentry to
society and that they do not pose a risk to the public.153 The Act, in effect,
could function as a quasi-parole system,154 and indeed seems to hold
itself out as such a replacement.155 In the same way that compassionate
release might provide review to every pre-Booker inmate, the Second
Look Act goes further by proposing that all inmates sentenced for more
than ten years be given the ability to seek review.156 Such an act still
fails to address many of the concerns of the lower courts mentioned
above. Questions also abound as to the efficiency of this system. One
wonders whether the judiciary is equipped to handle such a volume of
cases when given such broad interpretive authority, and thus whether
such a blanket provision—or total retroactivity of Booker—would be
practical. A judicial parole system may not be efficient without
additional resources.
Alternatively, compassionate release could become the main
sword of the judiciary, and Congress by proxy, to remedy a vast period
of harsh sentencing. The gateway to the compassionate release inquiry,
at least in part, could be the extraordinary and compelling reason of a
vast disparity between one’s sentence under the mandatory sentencing
regime and current sentencing practices. There is little question that
there are tools built in to the compassionate release system that would
allow courts to make it a de facto parole system, such as merely reducing
sentences and imposing supervised release.157 Were the gateway to
compassionate release thus swung wide open, courts could review
every pre-Booker sentence, balance the inmate’s history and risk with
the injustices of their sentence, and impose safeguards in the form of

152
153
154
155
156
157

Second Look Act of 2019, S. 2146, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
Id. § 3
Id.
Id.
Id. § 3
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
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supervised release in cases where there is a slight, albeit possible, risk
of recidivism.
The main issue with instituting either a brand new second look
scheme or allowing all pre-Booker inmates to seek compassionate
release is administrative. Both systems would rely on the courts to
execute them. In previous second look schemes, however, independent
agencies and federal institutions were created to oversee the process.158
This is not surprising, as second look schemes by their very name double
the opportunities of inmates to seek relief and would thus double the
docket load. At the same time, previous second look regimes suffered
from competing problems—a high volume of cases on the one hand and
virtual non-enforcement on the other.159 In light of the volume of cases
produced by second look schemes, prior regimes struggled to strike a
balance between fairness and efficiency.
Courts are likely in the best position to oversee second chances,
and compassionate release may be a proper tool for doing so. The
compassionate release statute, however, requires certain per se rules or
presumptions to make it both fair and easy to administer and to avoid
the pitfalls of previous regimes. In deciding when and how pre-Booker
inmates are granted compassionate release, Congress must provide
clear, easily administrable rules to the judiciary while balancing the
desire for a revisitation of draconian sentences with the risks of
usurping the power of the trial judge. To do so, Congress should allow
a change in the sentencing regime to carry weight, but condition that
weight by doing three things. First, Congress should instruct courts to
assume a strong rebuttable presumption for extraordinary and
compelling reasons to anyone whose sentence is sufficiently close to the
pre-Booker guidelines minimum. This would protect against undue
usurpations of trial judge power, as it limits resentencing to situations
where the sentencing judge likely would have sentenced lower had the
guidelines been advisory. More importantly, it would allow those whose
sentences are patently deemed “unfair” the opportunity to be released,
irrespective of an unblemished record.
Second, Congress could instruct courts to presume a strong
rebuttable presumption against extraordinary and compelling reasons
to anyone sufficiently close to the mandatory maximum. This has the
potential to balance concerns about overstepping sentencing judge
power and disrupting basic principles underlying the appellate system
with a desire for fair sentencing. Moreover, it would provide a

158
159

Hopwood, supra note 50, at 91, 100–05.
See Hoffman, supra note 52; Hopwood, supra note 50.
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presumptive rule which would allow courts to more efficiently handle a
bulk of petitions. A trial court would not review a sentence when it was
clear the judge’s discretion was not hindered by the old sentencing
regime. Lastly, for any inmate outside of these discretionary thresholds,
courts could provide that a change in the sentencing regime is not
determinative, prompting courts to consider a number of additional
factors—e.g., good works, rehabilitation, family matters, and so forth—
in making a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons.
In either case, the petitioner or the government would be
empowered to rebut the presumption based on a number of factors to
allow for individualized assessments that comport with fundamental
notions of fairness or the goals of sentencing. That is, the rebuttable
presumption would create an escape hatch in cases of clear unfairness,
on the one hand, or clear risks of recidivism on the other. Obvious
deviations in public sentiment or widely-held views of sentencing—in
many cases of marijuana or other drug offenses—might very well rebut
a presumption against release even where the sentencing judge gave the
maximum. A maximum sentence that results from stacking or
cumulative minimums might also rebut the presumption. Alternatively,
an inmate’s extreme disciplinary issues might rebut a grant of release,
even where the sentencing judge gave the minimum.
In any event, compassionate release may be a strong tool for
remedying pre-Booker sentences, provided guidance is given by
Congress and the Commission in contemplating the various interests
that must be balanced in its application: namely, separation of powers,
workability, fairness, and efficiency. Until then, courts will continue to
confront a variety of issues given the law’s inherently open-ended
nature.

